Patricide Pleads for Mercy as an Orphan

'Stoat brings word of Ross McKitrick's reviews of one of the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature papers.  While not commenting directly on the review Eli notes that in the introduction McKitrick nails just about any paper he ever wrote

  On March 8 2012 I was asked by JGR to review a revised version of the Wickham et al. paper. I submitted my review at the end of March. The authors had made very few changes and had not addressed any of the methodological problems, so I recommended the paper not be published. I do not know what the journal's decision was, but it is 4 months later and I can find no evidence on the BEST website that this or any other BEST project paper has been accepted for publication.

One can guess how McKitrick who really has no clues about the issue got to review the paper.  One guess is that Muller committed suicide because of his former friendship with Steve McIntyre, another is that one of the BEST authors, Judith Curry SuperSkeptic put in the oar.

For more on Ross McKitrick,see the Deltoid Collection but who can forget his confusion of radians and degrees, Celcius and Kelvin, and bad geography  -the last one infects just about any paper McKitrick has published in the last five years:)

Eli must invoke the McKitrick/McIntyre rule which requires that all of McKitrick's papers be withdrawn forthwith and the authors offer ritual apologies, burn their PhD degrees and retire to a life of flipping burgers at McDonalds serving coffee at Tim Horton's for having shattered scientific regulations established by the Climate Audit Institute.

Eli Can Retire Part XII: The Australian Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency Responds to Ian Plimer's 101 Questions

Worldwide, energy and environmental agencies are contributing to Eli's retirement fund by whacking the moles.  Today the Australian Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency offs Ian Plimer's 101 questions.  Eli has had a whack at a few of them, but really, this was a job for the real climate scientists.

This document provides answers to the 101 questions on climate change posed by Professor Ian Plimer in his latest book, How to get expelled from school: a guide to climate change for pupils, parents and punters (2011). Many of the questions and answers in Professor Plimer’s book are misleading and are based on inaccurate or selective interpretation of the science. The answers and comments provided in this document are intended to provide clear and accurate answers to Professor Plimer’s questions. The answers are based on up-to-date peer reviewed science, and have been reviewed by a number of Australian climate scientists.

Plimer asks

8. If global warming is human in origin, when will we feel it and when will it be dangerous?

And the AU Department of Climate Change Responds

Climate change becomes dangerous when it takes natural and human systems beyond environmental thresholds to which they can easily adapt. The more rapid the change, the less likely that adaptation can occur. Projections indicate that without action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions:

»temperatures in Australia could increase by up to 5 degrees by 2070;

»sea levels could rise by up to 80 cm by the end of the century (baseline of 1990), with larger increases possible; and

»we are likely to see more severe and intense extreme climatic events.

World governments have agreed that limiting temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures would help to reduce many of the most dangerous impacts of future climate change.

and, this could be a dangerous drinking game, 99

99.  Why do those advocating human-induced global warming vilify scientists who disagree rather than addressing genuine scientific questions?

And: Genuine scientific disputes are normally addressed through publication of alternative theories in peer-reviewed scientific journals. However, the scientists and others disagreeing with the consensus on human-induced climate change have rarely published in such journals, therefore avoiding critical scientific assessment of their work.

There is no single paper, or set of papers, that provides a plausible alternative explanation of recent warming. The few papers that do exist have been demonstrated to be flawed by the weight of peer-reviewed literature. There is now a vast body of literature supporting the mainstream understanding of climate change.

And a bit of optimism from the first comment

A New Blog on the Block

Magnus Westerstrand brings word of a new EGU blog, which looks quite interesting.

First articles include one by Christopher Pierce about writing that first proposal

I, like many other aspiring academics, am currently locked in the rounds of writing fellowship proposals that if funded will see me break free of the shackles of being somebody’s postdoc and become an independent researcher. Before I can dream about having the kudos of my own budget code, however, I must achieve the seemingly impossible and successfully sell my science. This innocuous phrase is hammered into us from the moment we brazenly set out on our PhD, but it is not until we have been broken by too many late night stints in the lab or in front of our machine that we come to realise exactly how mundane most scientific research is, and just how hard it is to make what we do sound interesting to an outsider.

One by Claire Desplats about passion and science

Man, this guy was good looking – tall, broad shouldered, soft eyed, tousled hair, cute little dimples, … and then…

“Oh wow – that is amazing!”

I looked in shock from Adonis to the oscilloscope we were using and discovered, that, yes, he was indeed talking about the little oscillating line on the dinky screen.  That’s when it struck me that I would probably never be a scientist.  That passion for the quivering green line just escaped me.  Not only that, but I couldn’t even begin to glimpse the reason behind the passion…

And one by Andrew Rushby, that makes Eli's heart flutter (see above) about possible biogeochemistry at Europa.  Perhaps the Bunny can really retire.

Oh yes, a request from the editors.  Should the management make links open new windows or simply link out?

Eli can retire, the EPA on Africa Gate

Stoat has arisen to contemplate the libel suit that Irene Meichsner brought (and won two out of three falls) from Stefan Rahmstorf. This showed up in a post on Klima Zwiebel, and, of course, at the non-innocent Roger Pielke's. Not innocent because Roger was deep into this thing early on.

It arises from some mischief that Eli's friends Jonathan Leake and Richard North had got up to, accusing the IPCC AR4 of making unjustified accusations about how climate change coule lead to decreased ag yields in Africa. IM, simply adopted their frame. Stoat makes the important point that no one is looking at whether SR was right or wrong on the science. The point he won is that the court agreed that his statement

Reading helps, if the author of the article, IM, herself had once looked in the IPCC report, she would have found out that the accusations were completely false.

was an allowable difference of opinion. But of course there is more

Turns out that the EPA and it's various friends in the denialsphere had already read the IPCC report AND the background information (this is long folks)
-------------------------------------------------

Comment (2-10):
The Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Ohio Coal Association, Peabody Energy, and the Southeastern Legal Foundation take issue with a statement in Section 16(b) of the TSD that: “In some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50% by 2020.” They claim the statement originated from gray literature in the IPCC AR4 and is therefore illegitimate. Southeastern Legal Foundation concludes: “The African Crop Yields claim stands as another example of the IPCC making a claim of imminent disaster that inappropriately relied on non-peer-reviewed literature…”

Response (2-10):
The IPCC statement cites a report by Dr. Ali Agoumi, a climate expert from Morocco (Agoumi, 2003) that was published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and funded by the government of Canada, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other public and private institutions. Based on EPA’s review of the report, it appears that the 50% number was not obtained from the peer-reviewed literature but rather from “vulnerability studies on three North African countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) with respect to climatic changes.” These vulnerability studies were prepared under the U.N. Environment Programme Global Environment Fund and included in the National Communications of these three countries to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (Ministry of Territory Development and Environment, 2001, Kingdom of Morocco, 2001 and Republic of Tunisia, 2001).

In response to publicity regarding this purportedly unsubstantiated statement in the IPCC report, Dr. Coleen Vogel, a contributing lead author of the IPCC chapter on Africa impacts, described the context in which Dr. Agoumi’s research was used. She explained that Agoumi’s report received rigorous scrutiny by her fellow authors and was thoroughly discussed during development of the chapter (Kretzmann, 2010). She explained that the decision to include this (gray literature) study was based on the paucity of peer-reviewed material relating to some parts of the world, particularly Africa, and the desire of the authors of the report to provide balanced information. The process described by Dr. Vogel is consistent with the IPCC’s guidance on the use of gray literature, as previously described in Volume 1 of the RTC document and further discussed in Subsection 2.2.4.4 of this Response to Petitions (RTP) document.

Finally, we note that this statement relates to impacts outside the United States, and it did not materially impact the determination of endangerment of public health and welfare in the United States. As noted in Subsection 2.1.1, the Endangerment Finding states (Section III.D): “The Administrator looked first at impacts in the United States itself, and determined that these impacts are reasonably anticipated to endanger the public health and the welfare of the U.S. population. That remains the Administrator’s position, and by itself supports her determination of endangerment.”

Comment (2-11):




Referring to an analysis published by Ben Pile, co-editor of the blog climateresistance.org on the blog of Roger Pielke, Jr. (Pile, 2010), the Southeastern Legal Foundation states that the primary reference supporting the IPCC’s statement on African crop yields “Vulnerability of North African Countries to Climatic Changes” (Agoumi, 2003) was from IISD, an advocacy group.

Regarding the IISD reference, Peabody Energy states:

Thus, the EPA based its findings on the IPCC WGII report, which based its findings on a report [the IISD report] published by an organization with a declared political interest in climate change that based its findings from an assessment of other non-peer reviewed national studies. This is not the way EPA science should be carried out.

Response (2-11):
The implication that the credibility of IPCC’s statement on African crop yields is diminished because the IPCC’s source (Agoumi, 2003) for the statement was published by an advocacy organization or an organization with a “declared political interest in climate change” is unsupported. The organization in question is IISD, which describes itself as follows:

The International Institute for Sustainable Development contributes to sustainable development by advancing policy recommendations on international trade and investment, economic policy, climate change, measurement and indicators, and natural resource management. By using Internet communications, we report on international negotiations and broker knowledge gained through collaborative projects with global partners, resulting in more rigorous research, capacity building in developing countries and better dialogue between North and South.

IISD’s vision is better living for all—sustainably; its mission is to champion innovation, enabling societies to live sustainably. IISD receives operating grant support from the Government of Canada, provided through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Environment Canada, and from the Province of Manitoba. The institute receives project funding from the Government of Canada, the Province of Manitoba, other national governments, United Nations agencies, foundations and the private sector. IISD is registered as a charitable organization in Canada and has 501(c)(3) status in the United States.

We find no reason to question the credibility and legitimacy of information produced by this organization on the basis of either its mission or funding sources. Moreover, neither the Southeastern Legal Foundation nor Peabody Energy provide any support for the implication that work by an organization such as IISD is automatically suspect or flawed.

Finally, Peabody Energy’s statement that EPA’s findings are based on this material is incorrect. As noted in Subsection 2.1.1, the Endangerment Finding states (Section III.D): “The Administrator looked first at impacts in the United States itself, and determined that these impacts are reasonably anticipated to endanger the public health and the welfare of the U.S. population. That remains the Administrator’s position, and by itself supports her determination of endangerment.”

We discuss the legitimacy of the science and underlying references for the African crop yields statement in Response 2-12.

Comment (2-12):
The Southeastern Legal Foundation alleges that EPA uncritically adopted the IPCC’s “faulty conclusion” with respect to crop yields. It refers to a blog by writer/commentator Richard North (North, 2010) to conclude the Agoumi (2003) reference cited by the IPCC on the issue of rain-fed agricultural yields in Africa relies on studies that “do not support the proposition for which they are cited.”

Relying on Richard North’s blog, the Southeastern Legal Foundation summarizes the vulnerability studies cited by Agoumi (2003) from the National Communications of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The Southeastern Legal Foundation notes that the Morocco National Communication “lends some support [to the Agoumi reference], saying that by 2020 during drought conditions cereal yields would decline up to 50%” but that “the data apply to cereal yields only, not crops in general as is implied by the IPCC.” The Southeastern Legal Foundation further states that “Algeria’s report said their yields would double, and be trimmed only slightly by ‘climate change’” and “Tunisia’s submission concluded the picture was mixed, but they could have an increase in rain and agricultural production.”

Response (2-12):
The IPCC’s statement on rain-fed agriculture in Northern Africa is not “faulty” and the Southeastern Legal Foundation presents no evidence that it was included uncritically in EPA’s TSD. Furthermore, the Southeastern Legal Foundation’s portrayal of findings on climate and crop yields from the National Communications of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria derived from Richard North’s blog is not complete. When all of the information in these National Communications is considered, we find there is broad support for Agoumi’s (2003) statements on North African rain-fed agriculture, which are:

• “Some of the key statistics regarding water, soil, urban areas and coastal zones are outlined below. . . . Decreasing rain-based agricultural yields with grain yields reduced by up to 50 percent in periods of drought.”
• “Studies on the future of vital agriculture in the region have shown the following risks, which are linked to climate change: . . . deficient yields from rain-based agriculture of up to 50 percent during the 2000–2020 period.”

PBL, in its report Assessing an IPCC Assessment (PBL, 2010a), makes the following important point with respect to IPCC’s statement on rain-fed agriculture in Africa:

This statement is not directly a statement on climate change, but on climate variability: in individual years, droughts can cause up to 50% in yield reductions. The implicit message here is that when droughts would become more frequent due to climate change, more years with up to 50% in yield reductions would occur. The statement could easily mislead readers into thinking that average annual yields could be reduced by up to 50% due to climate change. In the Summary for Policymakers of the Working Group II Report, the paragraph that contains this statement starts with a sentence introducing the notion of climate variability, which puts the statement more into context.

It is possible that petitioners misinterpreted the IPCC’s statement as suggesting that the IPCC’s projection was on the basis of climate change alone, given the Southeastern Legal Foundation’s assertion, for example, that IPCC was projecting “imminent disaster.” While we agree with PBL that the IPCC’s statement could easily mislead readers without the proper context, we note that, before quoting the IPCC’s projection on rain-fed agriculture, EPA’s TSD includes the statement “Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries and regions is projected to be severely compromised by climate variability [emphasis added] and change.” Therefore, EPA provided the proper context for the IPCC’s conclusion.

With respect to the basis for the conclusion itself, the following excerpts from the three countries’ National Communication reports on the issues of climate variability and change, precipitation, and crop yields provide broad support for the Agoumi (2003) statements along with accompanying discussion:

• The National Communication of Morocco states (Kingdom of Morocco, 2001):

The development of climate scenarios for Morocco according to IPCC methodology reveals the following results: . . .

• A trend towards a decrease in average annual rainfall volume by about 4% in 2020 compared to 2000 levels. . . .
• An increase in the frequency and intensity of droughts in the south and the east of the country.

The first quantitative estimate of possible CC [climate change] impacts on water resources in 2020 points to the fact that there would be an average and general decrease in water resources (in the order of 10 to 15 %...).

The study of CC [climate change] impacts on agriculture (dominated by cereal cultivation) in 2020 unfolds the following results: A decrease in cereal yields by 50% in dry years and 10% in normal years.

As the Southeastern Legal Foundation admits, the numbers from Morocco’s National Communication lend support to the statement in Agoumi (2003) that “studies on the future of vital agriculture in the region have shown the following risks, which are linked to climate change: . . . deficient yields from rain-based agriculture of up to 50 per cent during the 2000–2020 period.”

Richard North’s contention (North, 2010, as referred to by the Southeastern Legal Foundation) that “the data apply to cereal yields only, not crops in general as is implied by the IPCC” is arguable considering that Morocco’s National Communication indicates that agriculture is “dominated by cereal cultivation.” Thus, it is not unreasonable to use cereal cultivation as a proxy for all of agriculture in this cereal-crop-dominated region.

• The National Communication of Algeria (Ministry of Territory Development and Environment, 2001) states: ¹

Because of global warming, we must brace ourselves for chronic climate instability and greater frequency of droughts and floods. Droughts damage soils and floods destroy ground cover and contribute to the erosion of soils. With longer spans of time between dry and wet spells comes an even greater impact due to erosion. The southern regions of the country will be most directly impacted by increased temperatures and will be subject to the numerous consequences of accelerated desertification. The increased risk of drought presents the greatest challenge as a result of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) expect that the desert regions will extend northward in the Maghreb.

The above text provides a clear qualitative description of the risks climate change pose to agriculture in Algeria. In addition, this information from the National Communication of Algeria provides quantitative output from a model known as CROPWAT, which estimates changes in crop yields using climate change projections obtained from two general circulation models. The National Communication of Algeria reports:

… one can consider an average reduction in the output cereal of about 5.5 to 6.8%, corresponding mainly to instances of climate change [in 2020]( Ministry of Territory Development and Environment, 2001)

When considering these quantitative cereal yield changes, it is very important to note that these percentages refer to changes in cereal yields resulting primarily from climate change alone and not climate variability and change combined. The climate and hence precipitation variability in northern Africa can be quite large. For example, in the report Assessing an IPCC Assessment (PBL, 2010a), PBL states “…the [IPCC] authors made plausible that, due to current climate variability, the yields in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have been varying annually, including yield reductions of nearly 70% in individual years, in the period between 2000 and 2006.”

In other words, if these yield reductions resulting from greenhouse gas–induced climate change were superimposed on the yield reductions that might occur during a particularly dry period arising from the region’s characteristic precipitation variability, they would be higher and comparable with the results from the Morocco National Communication.

Finally, the Southeastern Legal Foundation’s reference to the Algeria National Communication’s projections for net increases in cereal projections in 2020 (relative to prior decades) is irrelevant and misleading. These increases are related not to climate variability and change but to changing agricultural practices and technology. Algeria’s National Communication makes clear that the effect of climate change on cereal yields is projected to be negative.

• The National Communication of Tunisia states (Republic of Tunisia, 2001):

…Tunisia is in a hydrous stress situation close to a shortage, sharpened by a high anthropic pressure. So minor they be, the Climate Changes can so, result in harmful consequences on water resources, on ecosystems depending of water, and on the different economic activities that need large quantities of water such as agriculture and tourism.

By modifying the evaporation and precipitation rate, the global warming will probably affect the hydrous climate balance and therefore the Tunisian water resources. In this way, if the intensification of the evaporation can lead to a possible important increase of the rain falls, it might not be sufficient to offset the decrease of the sweet water resources. Moreover, due to the global warming, the rain situation can be characterized by a bigger frequency of rains resulting from torrential storms and downpours, disappearing generally in streaming waters rather than be absorbed by the soils.

This information in the Tunesian National Communication does not provide any quantitative estimates of climate variability and/or change on rain-fed agriculture, but the clear qualitative implication is that climate changes—both drought and heavy precipitation events—will stress agriculture in Tunisia. We, therefore, find that the Southeastern Legal Foundation’s statement that “Tunisia’s submission concluded the picture was mixed, but they could have an increase in rain and agricultural production” is an overly optimistic interpretation of clearly expressed negative impacts.

Overall, these three National Communications (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) provide qualitative support for the fact the climate change will likely stress rain-fed agriculture in northern Africa, consistent with the portrayal of Agoumi (2003) and the IPCC. The National Communication of Morocco presents quantitative information consistent with what is reported by Agoumi (2003) and the IPCC (and hence the TSD), while the National Communication of Algeria provides quantitative information that is consistent with these sources when factoring in precipitation variability in addition to climate change. The National Communication of Tunisia does not provide quantitative information.

Our view of the literature behind Agoumi (2003) provides considerable evidence that the scientific basis for the IPCC’s conclusion is legitimate. The PBL assessment of the IPCC notes that “…additional explanations could have provided further foundations for the statement, had they been included in [IPCC’s Working Group II] Chapter 9.” We concur, but the Southeastern Legal Foundation conclusion that “…there is no support for the IPCC’s dramatic pronouncement on African crop yields” is significantly overstated.

Comment (2-13):
The Southeastern Legal Foundation provides the following reaction to the African rain-fed agriculture projection, which appeared in the Sunday Times (Leake, 2010a) and comes from former IPCC chair Robert Watson: “Any such projection [pertaining to African crop yields] should be based on peer-reviewed literature from computer modeling of how agricultural yields would respond to climate change. I can see no such data supporting the IPCC report.”

Response (2-13):
Watson may not have appreciated that peer-reviewed modeling studies of climate change impacts on agriculture in parts of Africa are limited. As the IPCC’s AR4 WGI report states (Christensen et al., 2007): “Several climate change projections based on RCM (regional climate model) simulations are available for southern Africa, but are much scarcer for other regions.” Accordingly, as we discuss in Subsection 2.2.4.4 of this RTP document, the IPCC references gray literature in these circumstances. We also note in Response 2-10 that these studies are not central to the TSD or the Endangerment Finding. Finally, though we discuss some additional modeling studies pertinent to Africa in RTP 2-15, those modeling studies (Parry et al., 2005 and Hulme et al., 2001) were conducted at the global and continental scales and contain limited results pertinent to northern Africa specifically.

Comment (2-14):
The Southeastern Legal Foundation states that EPA ignored contrary peer-reviewed literature and submits literature that the Sahel is greening (from National Geographic and several studies) in contrast to “IPCC horror stories” (projecting reductions in rain-fed agriculture).

Response (2-14):
EPA is aware of the literature cited by the petitioner that suggests greening in parts of the Sahara and Sahel (e.g., Seaquisti, et al., 2009; Anyamba, and Tucker, 2005; Hutchinson et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2005). The issue raised by petitioners is not new and was raised and responded to through the public comment process (see Response 2-73 in Volume 2 of the RTC document). Thus, these objections do not meet the test in Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 307(d)(7)(B) that it be impracticable to raise the objection during the public comment period or the reasons for the objection arose between June 24, 2009, and February 16, 2010. Nonetheless, we have reviewed these arguments and respond once again.

The fact that precipitation has increased recently in this region, as we note in our TSD in Section 4(d), does not mean that a combination of climate variability and change could not substantially reduce rain-fed agriculture in the future. The climate in this region is highly variable and while it has been relatively wet over the past decade or so, severe drought impacted the region for several decades from the 1960s to the 1990s and dry patterns could return to the region. As one of the studies (Nicholson, 2005) cited by the petitioner states: “The fluctuations between ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ in the Sahel/Soudan zones are extreme even on decadal and multi-decadal time scales.” Therefore, if the current wet period reverses to a dry period, the impacts of rain-fed agriculture on the region could be profound, especially when considering the potential enhancement of the drying from human-induced warming (i.e., climate change).

Finally, we note that the literature presented relates to impacts outside the United States, and it did not materially impact the determination of endangerment of public health and welfare in the United States. As noted in Subsection 2.1.1, the Endangerment Finding states (Section III.D): “The Administrator looked first at impacts in the United States itself, and determined that these impacts are reasonably anticipated to endanger the public health and the welfare of the U.S. population. That remains the Administrator’s position, and by itself supports her determination of endangerment.”

Comment (2-15):
The Southeastern Legal Foundation suggests that the IPCC ignored literature that drew different conclusions on the issue of rain-fed agriculture projections in Africa, specifically referring to two studies: Parry et al., 2005 and Hulme et al., 2001. The Southeastern Legal Foundation states: “Both Parry’s own paper and Hulme’s paper were known to and available to Professor Parry [co-chair of IPCC Working Group II] in composing the WGII Report and the Synthesis Report. Yet, Parry’s WGII report ignored his own paper and that of Hulme, which did not predict disaster, and instead relied on one that did, the Agoumi paper, even though it did so incorrectly and improperly and was not peer-reviewed.” The Southeastern Legal Foundation further notes that Hulme et al. (2001) were careful to note uncertainties in understanding African climate change, and implies that the IPCC was not as careful.

Response (2-15):
We have reviewed these papers (Parry et al., 2005, and Hulme et al., 2001) and find that, while not directly comparable with Agoumi (2003), they do not contradict that source. We also find, contrary to the Southeastern Legal Foundation’s assertion, that both of these studies were in fact cited by the IPCC, although not always in the same section or context as Agoumi (2003).

The Parry et al. (2005) study reports the results of a series of research projects that aimed to evaluate the implications of climate change for food production and risk of hunger. The analysis in this study is performed at global and continental scales rather than the regional scale. This is likely why it is not discussed in Chapter 5 of Working Group II’s contribution to the AR4 (Easterling et al., 2007), where Agoumi (2003) is cited in a section focusing on regional impacts in Africa (specifically on Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). The Parry et al. (2005) study is cited multiple times in Chapter 5 of Working Group II’s contribution (“Food, Fiber, and Forest Products,” Easterling et al., 2007), which provides a global perspective. Therefore, Parry did not “ignore his own paper” as stated by the Southeastern Legal Foundation.

One of the primary conclusions of Parry et al. is that “the region of greatest risk [of losses in food production, and hunger due to climate change] is Africa.” Parry et al. (2005) provide specific cereal yield projections for the 2020s and 2080s resulting from different GHG emission scenarios. They state for the globe: “By the 2020s, small changes in cereal yield are evident in all scenarios, but these fluctuations are within historical variations.” For the 2080s, Parry et al. (2005) provide projections specific to Africa – but not northern Africa specifically, stating that climate change could reduce cereal yields by up to 30%. Importantly, the changes in cereal yield projected for the 2020s and 2080s are driven by GHG-induced climate change and likely do not fully capture interannual precipitation variability which can result in large yield reductions during dry periods, as the IPCC (Christensen et al., 2007) states: “…there is less confidence in the ability of the AOGCMs (atmosphere-ocean general circulation models) to generate interannual variability in the SSTs (sea surface temperatures) of the type known to affect African rainfall, as evidenced by the fact that very few AOGCMs produce droughts comparable in magnitude to the Sahel droughts of the 1970s and 1980s.” Given the different scopes of the two analyses, it is misleading to state that the Parry et al. projections are inconsistent with the Agoumi (2003) yield projections.

The Hulme et al. (2001) study, which reviews observed (1900–2000) and possible future (2000–2100) continent-wide changes in temperature and rainfall over Africa, is also not ignored by the IPCC, contrary to the assertion of the petitioner. In fact, it is cited twice in IPCC’s Working Group II Chapter 9 on Africa (Boko et al., 2007):

• Hulme et al. (2001) is cited in a statement about the complexity of African climatology: “Other factors that complicate African climatology include dust aerosol concentrations and sea-surface temperature anomalies, which are particularly important in the Sahel region (Hulme et al., 2001; Prospero and Lamb, 2003) and southern Africa (Reason, 2002), deforestation in the equatorial region (Semazzi and Song, 2001; Bounoua et al., 2002)…”
• Hulme et al. (2001) is also cited in a statement pertaining to uncertainties in precipitation projections in the western Sahel (Boko et al., 2007): “For the western Sahel (10 to 18°N, 17.5°W to 20°E), there are still discrepancies between the models: some projecting a significant drying (e.g., Hulme et al., 2001; Jenkins et al., 2005) and others simulating a progressive wetting with an expansion of vegetation into the Sahara (Brovkin, 2002; Maynard et al., 2002; Claussen et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2004; Haarsma et al., 2005; Kamga et al., 2005; Hoerling et al., 2006).”

These examples demonstrate that the IPCC both cited Hulme et al. (2001) and transparently discussed the complexity of Africa’s climate and the uncertainty in African climate projections. This treatment is appropriate and reasonable, contrary to the petitioner’s implication.

Even in light of the complexities and uncertainties, Hulme et al. (2001) state that a “warming climate will nevertheless place additional stresses on water resources [in Africa], whether or not future rainfall is significantly altered” and they project reduced precipitation over Tunisia. Hulme et al. (2001) do not, however, provide projections for changes in cereal yields (from changes in rain-fed agriculture), so their results cannot be compared directly with Agoumi (2003) or its supporting documents (discussed in Response 2-12).

Overall, the IPCC does not ignore either the Parry et al. (2005) or Hulme et al. (2001) studies. The findings of these studies, while not directly comparable with Agoumi (2003), are broadly consistent. Hulme et al. (2001) project increased drying over northern Africa while Parry et al. (2005) project an increased risk of reduced cereal yields over all of Africa. The petitioner’s claim that IPCC was not careful or acted inappropriately in this regard is not confirmed by careful review of the material.
-------------------------------------

Eli can retire

Consider a Spherical Truncated Icosahedron

UPDATE: A much better title

In the comments, palindrom points to a toy model which has been submitted to EGU.

Over in the wacky world of Huffington Post, a denialist troll posted a link to this odd paper:

http://mee­tingorgani­zer.copern­icus.org/E­GU2011/EGU­2011-4505-­1.pdf

in which Hermann Harde, a laser spectroscopist morphs into a climate modeler, inserts some very good molecular data into what appears to be a rather crude, toy, do-it-yourself planetary atmosphere, and decides the CO2 isn't quite what it's cracked up to be as a greenhouse gas. Can someone who is actually expert at this give an authoritative review of this? (Dammit, Jim), I'm an astronomer, not a planetary atmospheres person, so I don't have the requisite deep knowledge of planetary atmospheres models, but the inquiring minds posting here ought to know ...

John points out the obvious (damn it get to work and post stuff, Eli is gonna retire)

Harde calculates a smaller rise in global temperature (about 0.45 C) as a result of doubling CO2, compared with the IPCC number (3C), by a factor of about 7.

The IPCC result is based on: (1) a rise of 1.2 C from doubled ed CO2 in the atmosphere, causing an enhanced Greenhouse effect, and (2) positive feedbacks (ice-albedo, rising water vapor concentrations) which raise the IPCC estimate to about 3 C +_ 1.5 C.

Harde has calculated only the atmospheric effects, and has ignored feedbacks completely. So his result of 0.45 C should be compared with the IPCC "no-feedback" estimate of 1.2 C. Thus the discrepancy is more like a factor of three, not seven.

but we still got a factor of three, so Eli went and read the damn thing. It was actually quite nice, some original stuff in there like

The propagation length of the sun light in these layers, which depends on the angle of incidence to the atmosphere and therefore on the geographic latitude, is included by considering the earth as a truncated icosahedron (bucky ball) consisting of 32 surfaces with well defined angles to the incoming radiation and assigning each of the areas to one of the three climate zones.

but where the factor of three comes from is easy to see

To identify the influence of the absorbing gases on the climate and particularly the effect of an increasing CO2- concentration on the warming of the earth, a two-layer climate model was developed, which describes the atmosphere and the ground as two layers acting simultaneously as absorbers and Planck radiators. Also heat transfer by convection between these layers and horizontally by winds or oceanic currents between the climate zones is considered. At equilibrium each, the atmosphere as well as the ground, delivers as much power as it sucks up from the sun and the neighbouring layer or climate zone.With this model for each climate zone the temperature progression of the earth and the atmosphere is calculated as a function of the CO2-concentration and several other parameters like ozone and cloud absorption, short- and long-wavelength scattering at clouds as well as the reflection at the earth’s surface.

The problem is that there are only two levels. The greenhouse effect is driven by the increase in the height of the atmosphere from which radiation that can be absorbed or emitted by CO2 can reach space. This cannot be captured in a two level model, which, of necessity has to crudely average over a lot of parameters. Of course some of the devil is in the details, such as how much water vapor, clouds, etc is in the second level. The figure, of course, is from Rabett Run's reply to Gerlich and Tschuschner. Harde's stuff is of a much higher quality than the G&T joke.

Oh yes, this appears to be a bad week for climate denialists. Roy Spencer took five on the nose, two from Arthur Smith and three from Barry Bickmore

Eli can retire Part XV - Bart blushes

Hi gang, the EPA has made sure that Eli will never have to go back to work, dumping another load on the petitioners for reconsideration. Remember the great scandal about only 26% of the Netherlands being below sea level while the WGII report said 55%, wonder where that came from?
-------------------------------
2.1.2 Accuracy of Statement on Percent of the Netherlands Below Sea Level

Comment (2-1):
Peabody Energy and the State of Texas contend that the IPCC erroneously stated (in Working Group II’s contribution to the AR4) that 55% of the Netherlands is below sea level, whereas the actual number is much lower according to Dutch materials (26%).

Response (2-1):
The statistic quoted in the IPCC AR4 is inaccurate. When this error was identified, PBL (2010b) published a correction:

In the 2007 IPCC report by the Working Group 2 (Climate change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability) a mistake has entered the text that was supplied by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, regarding the risks of flooding for the Netherlands. In the chapter on Europe, on page 547, it says that 55 per cent of the Netherlands is below sea level (‘The Netherlands is an example of a country highly susceptible to both sea level rise and river flooding because 55% of its territory is below sea level’). This should have read that 55 per cent of the Netherlands is at risk of flooding; 26 per cent of the country is below sea level, and 29 per cent is susceptible to river flooding. Examples of the latter are the near floodings, in the mid-1990s, of areas along the rivers Meuse and Waal – areas that are well above sea level.

The IPCC agrees that this statistic is incorrect in the AR4, and also notes that the same mistake was made by other reputable groups (Reuters, 2010). For example, the IPCC—in a written statement provided to Reuters—indicated that a report from the Dutch Ministry of Transport had stated “‘about 60%’ of the country is below sea level,” and referred to a European Commission study saying “about half” (Reuters, 2010). As noted by the IPCC statement, the error was not made by authors of the AR4, but originated with PBL, which supplied the text. To correct the mistake, the IPCC published an official erratum (IPCC, 2010d):

2) Page 547. Section 12.2.3. Line 20: Delete “below sea level” and replace with “at risk flooding”.

The IPCC was further quoted as saying (Reuters, 2010): “The sea level statistic was used for background information only, and the updated information remains consistent with the overall conclusions.”

In its independent report Assessing an IPCC Assessment (PBL, 2010a), PBL, which was responsible for the error, states:

We acknowledge that this error was not the fault of the IPCC (Coordinating) Lead Authors or Co-Chairs. The error was made by a Contributing Author from the PBL, and the (Coordinating) Lead Authors [of the IPCC] are not to blame for relying on Dutch information provided by a Dutch agency.

--------------------------------------------

Oh yes, what did this all mean, the EPA says nothing much

EPA concludes that this error is minor and inconsequential to the Administrator’s Endangerment Finding. EPA does not refer to or rely on this statistic in the Endangerment Finding or supporting documents, and this information does not pertain to endangerment of public health and welfare in the United States in any meaningful way. It does not call into question the integrity of the IPCC, and it has no impact on the scientific support for EPA’s Endangerment Finding. Furthermore, as the error pertains to a statistic outside the United States, it is not relevant to the Endangerment Finding. As noted in Subsection 2.1.1, the Endangerment Finding states (Section III.D): “The Administrator looked first at impacts in the United States itself, and determined that these impacts are reasonably anticipated to endanger the public health and the welfare of the U.S. population. That remains the Administrator’s position, and by itself supports her determination of endangerment.”

Bart can retire - Part I

Bart Verheggen, owner and operator of My View on Climate Change, aka Our Changing Climate, reports on a study carried out by the Planbureau voor de Leefoomgeving (PBL),aka the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, on the reliability of Working Groups II's report in the AR4. More exactly, the PBL's political masters asked for a specific evaluation of the chapters evaluating probable regional changes. Eli will encourage you to hie over there to read the results, but the general outcome was that the report was reliable, even though they found one additional clunker. What caught Eli's attention was that the PBL took comments from the public. Of the 40 or so that came across the transome, ONLY 3 were relevant, but the PBL provided answers to them all and Rabett Run is pleased to add them to his retirement home.

COMMENT: It has come to my attention that the PBL has opened a website for reporting errors in the IPCC report. It is apparent to me, however, that this website limits the chapters on which the comments must be about and allows for no other comments or questions. This unfortunately impeded the open and honest debate about the IPCC report that many seek. Therefore I take this opportunity to write to you in the hope that my comments will be taken into account by you and your colleagues.

I will keep my questions and comments brief, acceptingthe risk that they may not in all respects be expressed perfectly scientifically or technically. For this I apologize. If my questions are not clear, I am happy to explain them further.

My questions / observations are as follows:

1. The effect of the flood of human-produced CO2 on the (alleged) (enhanced) greenhouse effect.

The IPCC assumes a significant effect of CO2 on climate. Although CO2 is a greenhouse gas, the influence of water vapor in the atmosphere is much greater, given the much larger amount of water vapor in the atmosphere than CO2. The influence of CO2 on a (possible) temperature increase is only about 3% of the total impact. I would like to understand why the IPCC ascribes a major influence to anthropogenic CO2.

2. The IPCC reports the report was "peer-reviewed". P

I am curious to hear from you, how the comments of "peers" were handled . It could be (I blame no one!) that only the positive reactions were considered and the negative ones were ignored. In that case it would still be peer-reviewd "despite the negative comments not being considered.

Note: In my time I did TNO tests of devices. Some were unequivocally rejected. But some of those who submitted devices made a point in their advertising that their products were "TNO-tested"!! Linguistically that was correct, of course, but it twisted the meaning. Can you confirm that this state of affairs does not apply to the concept of "peer-reviewed "in assessing the IPCC reports?

3. "Global warming".

The models in the IPCC reports are assume a continuous global warming. How does this model, account for the already more than 10 years of continuous cooling of the earth? The temperature has not increased anymore in the last 10 years. Nature does not seem to track any of the models! How reliable are the models then?

Those are my questions. I look forward to your response.

ANSWER: Thanks for your comment submitted within the framework of our research on errors in the report of IPCC Working Group II.

Your comment focuses on issues outside the limits of our investigation. However, I want to briefly respond to your letter.

Water vapor is the main greenhouse gas, because water is present in abundance on Earth, and thus relatively high levels in the atmosphere. Approximately two thirds of the greenhouse effect is attributable to water vapor. The important role of water vapor has been completely dealt with by the IPCC. Take a look at this webpage on Climate Portal, which Bart Strengers of PBL in a discussion with Hans Labohm including addresses the role of water vapor: http://www.klimaatportaal.nl/pro1/general/start.asp?i=0&j=0&k=0&p=0&Itemid=367 (in Dutch, use Google Translate to get an idea)

As to the effect on the CO2 concentration of the 3% anthropogenic emissions of CO2, I refer you to to this Web Portal on Climate: http://www.klimaatportaal.nl/pro1/general/start.asp?i=0&j=0&k%20=%200&p%20=0&Itemid=565

You also ask about the review process of the IPCC. You can see what happened to the comments on the IPCC website. See http://hcl.harvard.edu/collections/ipcc/index.html where comments on each chapter and each stage of the process is documented showing all the comments. Click on a section and see in the rightmost column, the responses of the IPCC authors.

Finally, a response to your comment about global warming over the past 10 years. Climate models show not only an increase in temperature. Climate models take into account natural variations in temperature over a period of 10-15 years, including temporary cooling, even when CO2 concentrations are continually rising. See for example the scientist-versus-skeptic blog on the website of the NIS: http://weblogs.nos.nl/klimaat/2009/12/17/wedden-dat-het-opwarmt/

The causes of limited warming in the last 10 years is under discussion in science. See:
- Solomon et al., Science 5 March 2010, Vol. - Solomon et al, Science 5 March 2010, Vol. 327. 327. no. 5970, pp. No. 5970, pp. 1219 - 1223: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/short/327/5970/1219 1219 - 1223: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/short/327/5970/1219
- News in Climate Science and Exploring Boundaries (december 2009). - News in Climate Science and Exploring Boundaries (December 2009). On our website see: http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2009/News-in-climate-science-and-exploring-boundaries.html .

When our investigation is completed, we will inform you of the results.

Eli can retire Part XIV - Death, no taxes

Continuing Eli's lazy stroll through the US EPA responses to comments. They are serious folks.

Comment (5-11):
A commenter (8320) submits information and references on the potential health effects of global climate change. The commenter discusses the following topics: extreme heat events, wildfires, vector-borne diseases, water-borne diseases, air quality and human heath, aeroallergens and allergies, environmental justice, and the vulnerability of children to effects from air quality. The commenter stresses that “climate change will alter the global environment and present major challenges to the health and welfare of children.”

Response (5-11):
EPA has reviewed the submitted comments and associated references, and finds that they include several very recent and relevant studies (e.g., St. Louis and Hess, 2008; Patz et al., 2008; Jerret et al., 2009) that confirm the scientific support for health related impacts summarized in the TSD.

In one example, Luber and McGeehin (2008) call extreme heat events “the most prominent cause” of weather-related human mortality in the United States, noting that they are responsible for more deaths annually than hurricanes, lightning, tornadoes, floods, and earthquakes combined. We note that the recently released U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) report (Karl et al., 2009) also concludes that mortality from heat is the number one weather-related cause of death and cites an analysis of nine U.S. cities showing that deaths rise with increases in temperature and humidity with no confounding or effect modification due to air pollution (Zanobetti and Schwartz, 2008).

Another recent study (Jerret et al., 2009) provided by the commenter indicates that high levels of ground-level ozone can increase the risk of asthma-related hospital visits and premature mortality and that the effect of long-term exposure to ozone on air pollution–related mortality was not known. The study indicates that ozone exposure is associated with the risk of death from respiratory causes, and that long-term, low-level exposure can be lethal. Researchers studied the outcomes of almost 500,000 adults in 96 metropolitan regions who enrolled in the American Cancer Society Cancer Prevention Study in 1982 and 1983 and were tracked for an average of 18 years. In addition, the study by Jerrett et al. (2009) looked at associations between ozone concentrations and the risk of death, in a single-pollutant model and in a two-pollutant model with fine particulate matter (PM2.5). In two-pollutant models, researchers demonstrated a significant increase in the risk of death from respiratory causes in association with an increase in ozone concentration. The study found that every increase in 10 parts per billion (ppb) in average ozone concentrations was associated with a roughly 4% increase in mortality from respiratory causes. This translated in Los Angeles to a 43% increase in the risk of dying from respiratory causes. Eastern cities like New York and Washington had an average increased risk of about 25% to 27%. EPA concludes this study fills important knowledge gaps in health impact literature from increases in ozone exposure (at low levels).

Another study provided by the commenter provides evidence of vector-borne disease shift attributed to climate. For example, in Europe, geographic shifts in the tick’s distribution have been attributed to climate change. An expansion of the tick’s range into higher elevations in the Czech Republic corresponded to rising temperatures. A shift toward higher latitudes in Sweden corresponded to a reduction in the number of very cold winter days (Gage et al., 2008).

Based on review of the cited literature from the commenter, we conclude that the information provided is generally consistent with, and in several cases even stronger than the assessment literature summarized in the TSD.

Eli can retire Part XIII - Tom Segalstad is an old buddy

In which the EPA explains to Judith Curry why Tom Segalstad is wrong, wrong, wrong.

Comment (2-3):
Several commenters state that CO2 has a short lifetime in the atmosphere (0711.1, 0714.1): for example, a commenter (1616) claims that the lifetime of CO2 can be at most 20 years based on the 12% annual exchange of CO2 with the surface ocean and 10% exchange between the surface and deep ocean as shown in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) carbon cycle diagram, and two commenters (3440.1, 3722) state that the overwhelming majority of scientific papers support a residence time of seven years in contrast to the TSD and IPCC. Several commenters (e.g. 3722) cite Professor Segalstad who has stated, based on his work on CO2 residence times (Segalstad 1997), that the assumption of a 50- to 200-year lifetime by IPCC results in a “missing sink” of 3 Gt of carbon a year, which is evidence that IPCC is mistaken.

Another commenter submitted Essenhigh (2009), which developed a box model and also found that the lifetime of CO2 was on the order of a few years.

Response (2-3):
EPA reviewed the information presented, as well as the work by Segalstad, and finds that it does not address the lifetime of a change in atmospheric concentration of CO2, but rather the lifetime in the atmosphere of an individual molecule of CO2. These are two different concepts. As stated in the First IPCC Scientific Assessment, “The turnover time of CO2 in the atmosphere, measured as the ratio of the content to the fluxes through it, is about 4 years. This means that on average it takes only a few years before a CO2 molecule in the atmosphere is taken up by plants or dissolved in the ocean. This short time scale must not be confused with the time it takes for the atmospheric CO2 level to adjust to a new equilibrium if sources or sinks change.

This adjustment time ... is of the order of 50–200 years, determined mainly by the slow exchange of carbon between surface waters and the deep ocean” (Watson et al., 1990). The magnitudes of these large balanced sources and sinks are addressed in response 2-2, and are similar to those represented in the NASA carbon cycle diagram. Newer research has only extended and confirmed this statement from the first IPCC assessment report (Denman et al., 2007). A recent approximation for this perturbation lifetime is sometimes represented as the sum of decay functions with timescales of 1.9 years for a quarter of the CO2 emissions, 18.5 years for a third of the CO2, 173 years for a fifth of the CO2, and a constant term representing a nearly permanent increase for the remaining fifth (Forster et al., 2007).

The “missing sink” that was referred to by a commenter is also addressed in response 2-2, and is now called the “residual land sink.” The magnitude of this sink is about 2.6 Gt of carbon per year, with significant uncertainty. Denman et al. (2007) included a hypothesis that a portion of this sink is due to the increased growth of undisturbed tropical forest due to CO2 fertilization, but the carbon accumulation of natural systems is hard to quantify directly. The uncertainty in determining the size and nature of this residual sink does not contradict the assessment literature conclusions about the perturbation lifetime of CO2 concentration changes in the atmosphere, but is reflected in the carbon cycle uncertainty for future projections of CO2 (see responses regarding carbon cycle uncertainty in Volume 4 on future projections).

The box model in Essenhigh (2009) is clearly flawed: the results from this model as reported in the paper include a lifetime for CO2 containing the 14C isotope that is a factor of 3 different from the lifetime of CO2 containing the 12C isotope. This difference in lifetimes is not scientifically compatible with the immense difficulty involved in isotope separation. The model assumes that each “control volume” (each volume represents either the ecosystem, the surface ocean, or the deep ocean) is perfectly mixed, which is contrary to the observations of oceanic CO2 which show that storage of carbon in the ocean is only at 15% of the equilibrium value, and that the mixing time between the surface ocean and intermediate and deep oceans is on the order of years to centuries (Field and Raupach, 2004). Additionally, the paper uses only historical fossil fuel emissions of CO2, without including land use change CO2, and contains the same confusion about “residence lifetime” and “adjustment lifetime” that has been addressed above.

A common analogy used for CO2 concentrations is water in a bathtub. If the drain and the spigot are both large and perfectly balanced, then the time than any individual water molecule spends in the bathtub is short. But if a cup of water is added to the bathtub, the change in volume in the bathtub will persist even when all the water molecules originally from that cup have flowed out the drain. This is not a perfect analogy: in the case of CO2, there are several linked bathtubs, and the increased pressure of water in one bathtub from an extra cup will actually lead to a small increase in flow through the drain, so eventually the cup of water will be spread throughout the bathtubs leading to a small increase in each, but the point remains that the "residence time" of a molecule of water will be very different from the "adjustment time" of the bathtub as a whole.

This analogy does not hold for other GHGs: methane, HFCs, and N2O are actually destroyed chemically in the atmosphere, unlike CO2 where the carbon is not destroyed but merely shifted from one reservoir to another, and therefore the residence lifetime of these gases is fairly close to the adjustment lifetime of their concentrations in the atmosphere.

Similarly, any given molecule of CO2 is only expected to stay in the atmosphere for a few years before it moves into the oceans or ecosystem, but the change in atmospheric concentration due to combustion of fossil fuels can persist for much longer. Indeed, because the oceans and ecosystems are finite, some small fraction of CO2 emissions will have a perturbation lifetime in the atmosphere of thousands of years (Karl et al., 2009).

Next

Eli can retire Part XII - The commenters get something right

Another in our series, but this time the EPA and the commenters get it right

Comment (6-44):
Commenters (e.g., 2791, 10298) state their support for the Findings, noting the potential for increased stress from heat, drought, insects, and disease on plant and tree populations. Others (2599, 10081) from the western United States voice their support for the Findings and describe their experiences with hot summers and serious wildfires. Other commenters (e.g., 3421, 4748, 6894) state their support for the Findings and express concern about the effects of current and future extreme weather events on the forestry industry, including heat waves, droughts, floods, wildfires, and hurricanes. One commenter (5844) describes how projected climate impacts, particularly the increased risk of wildfire on forestry and forest biodiversity will affect him personally given his enjoyment of hiking, camping, and communing with nature in the forests of the Pacific Northwest.

A commenter (3501) states his support for the Findings, indicating that the western United States and Canada are already seeing widespread changes in the natural landscape due to climate change. Hotter temperatures are causing more frequent and persistent drought in the West, which contribute to forest fires and pine beetle infestations. A weather-related pine beetle infestation has decimated millions of acres of forest in the western United States Western US and Canada. At the current rate of destruction, 80% of the forests of British Columbia will have been destroyed within five years and the rest of the West will lose 50% of its forests by mid-century. The forest fire season in the West is now 78 days longer than 25 years ago and it is well recognized that our forest fires have become more frequent, more intense and more destructive.

Response (6-44):
We reviewed the comments provided and note they are generally consistent with the discussion of climate impacts on forestry in the TSD, although commenters do not provide specific references to support their claims. As summarized in the TSD and in our responses to previous comments in this volume, disturbances like wildfire and insect outbreaks are increasing and are likely to intensify in a warmer future with drier soils and longer growing seasons.

The Technical Support Document provides the background for this, of which Eli will quote a bit

10(d) Insects and Diseases
Insects and diseases are a natural part of forested ecosystems and outbreaks often have complex causes. The effects of insects and diseases can vary from defoliation and retarded growth, to timber damage, to massive forest diebacks. Insect life cycles can be a factor in pest outbreaks; and insect life cycles are sensitive to climate change. Many northern insects have a two-year life cycle, and warmer winter temperatures allow a larger fraction of overwintering larvae to survive. Recently, spruce budworm in Alaska has completed its life cycle in one year, rather than the previously observed duration of two years (Field et al., 2007). Recent warming trends in the United States have led to earlier spring activity of insects and proliferation of some species, such as the mountain pine beetle (Easterling et al., 2007).

During the 1990s, Alaska’s Kenai Peninsula experienced an outbreak of spruce bark beetle over 6,200 square miles (16,000 km2) with 10 to 20% tree mortality (Anisimov et al., 2007). Also following recent warming in Alaska, spruce budworm has reproduced farther north reaching problematic numbers (Anisimov et al., 2007). Climate change may indirectly affect insect outbreaks by affecting the overall health and productivity of trees. For example, susceptibility of trees to insects is increased when multi-year droughts degrade the trees’ ability to generate defensive chemicals (Field, et al., 2007). Warmer temperatures have already enhanced the opportunities for insect spread across the landscape in the United States and other world regions (Easterling et al., 2007).

The IPCC (Easterling et al., 2007) stated that modeling of future climate change impacts on insect and pathogen outbreaks remains limited. Nevertheless, the IPCC (Field et al., 2007) states with high confidence that, across North America, impacts of climate change on commercial forestry potential are likely to be sensitive to changes in disturbances from insects and diseases, as well as wildfires.

The CCSP report (Ryan et al., 2008) states that the ranges of the mountain pine beetle and southern pine beetle are projected to expand northward as a result of average temperature increases. Increased probability of spruce beetle outbreak as well as increase in climate suitability for mountain pine beetle attack in high-elevation ecosystems has also been projected in response to warming (Ryan et al., 2008).

Climate change can shift the current boundaries of insects and pathogens and modify tree physiology and tree defense. An increase in climate extremes may also promote plant disease and pest outbreaks (Easterling et al., 2007).

And so, we get to the scary bits To be continued. . .

This is the Environmental Protection Agency, Division of Answering Ignorant Questions from Belligerent Know-it-alls, Climate Sector. Can I help you?

Thanks to MT, for an even better way of labeling the on-going Eli used to be able to retire threads. Today we start the EPA blonks Plimer series

Comment (2-17):
A commenter (11454.1) provided quotes from Heaven and Earth (Plimer, 2009) claiming that CO2 was higher in 1942 than today based on the “Pettenkofer” method, and denigrating the use of infrared spectroscopy in modern CO2 analysis due to a lack of validation against the Pettenkofer method. Another quote provided from the same source disparaged the Mauna Loa data because only 18% of the raw data is used in statistical analyses.

Response (2-17):
We have reviewed Plimer’s book, and find that it has not been peer-reviewed or undergone any objective and thorough evaluation of its claims. The Pettenkofer method is a chemical method for determining CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere. Regardless of its accuracy, if used in inappropriate locations such as in or near towns or other areas that have high local CO2 concentrations, the Pettenkofer method will not result in a measurement of the global background concentrations (in contrast to the current measurement stations such as the Mauna Loa station, which are carefully placed in remote locations). See response 2-4 regarding CO2 concentrations reported by Beck (2007).

We find that the use of infrared spectroscopy for CO2 measurements has been validated extensively. Not only are infrared spectrometers used in scientific laboratories around the world, but the instruments used for measuring global background CO2 concentrations are regularly calibrated against CO2 samples that have been assessed by manometric measurements, involving condensing and separating CO2 and N2O from the remainder of the air and using a gas chromatograph to determine the CO2 to N2O ratio in the liquefied sample. This manometric procedure is estimated to have an accuracy of 0.07 ppm. Therefore, we find no support for the commenter’s objections to the use of infrared spectrometers.

With respect to Plimer’s claim that the Mauna Loa dataset was selectively edited in order to make an upward-trending CO2 curve, NOAA provides a rigorous description of the process used to measure, calibrate, and report the data from Mauna Loa at http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/about/co2_measurements.html (Tans and Thining, 2008). The data are all archived, including any raw data that are not included in the final reporting. In contrast to Plimer, we find that 52% of the hourly data from 2008 were retained, consistent with the statement from NOAA that there is an average of 13.6 retained hours per day (57%) over the entire record. We also find that, with the exception of the 15% of the data that were recorded as “instrument malfunction,” the average of the included data in 2008 was within 0.2 ppm of the excluded data, contrary to the assertion by Plimer that selective editing was used in order to change the trend. These data have been extensively reviewed, published in the peer-reviewed literature, and ultimately also used by the broad climate change assessment community. In addition, the data from Mauna Loa are consistent with data collected at remote sites around the world, as well as with samples collected in air flasks and measured at a central site rather than on location (these flask data are on average within 0.11 ppm of the infrared analyzer data).

The confidence that the modern CO2 record gathered around the world represents accurate measurements of the global background CO2 concentration is therefore extremely high, in contrast to the northern European data collected by the Pettenkofer method in 1942. Therefore, we determined that the assertions of the commenter and the underlying source are not consistent with the current scientific literature.

Gibts nicht mehr

Eli can Retire Part XI - A bunch of denial denied

Eli is really lazy, he is letting Cthulhu do the looking up for goodies in the US EPA responses to challenges to its Endangerment Finding for increasing CO2 concentrations.

Comment (2-19):
Some commenters write that CO2 is a weak GHG compared to other gases (0425, 0498, 0639.1, 1187.1, 1217.1, 2759, 10595); they note that CH4’s potency is 1000 times greater (0425) or that water is 95% of total greenhouse effect (10158, several others), implying that CO2 emissions can not have a large effect on the earth’s climate.

Other commenters write that CO2 is a weak GHG because it is limited as to how much radiation it can absorb. For example, a commenter asks why Mars is not warm despite a 95% CO2 atmosphere (2895), and another states that doubling CO2 would only have a small (0.4°C) effect (2759). One commenter states that as CO2 concentrations increase, the forcing does not increase—CO2 “has a forcing limit of 325 ppm” (0582). Another cites Plimer, who states that it has a maximum threshold (11454), and another states that CO2 does not absorb infrared (286).

Others point out that CO2 is less than 0.05% of the atmosphere (0153, 0455, 0498, 2885, 3214.1), and therefore presumably has a very small effect. A commenter (3722) claims that because of logarithmic forcing, 75% of the warming due to CO2 doubling should have already happened, therefore future warming due to CO2 will be small. A commenter (1009.1) notes that increased CO2 will not lead to much increase in temperature because of the logarithmic relationship and saturation.

Response (2-19):
Although it is true that CO2 has a smaller warming effect per kilogram or per molecule than a gas like CH4, it plays a larger role in the warming of the atmosphere. For example, Table 2.14 of Forster et al. (2007) lists radiative effects per ppb, lifetimes, and global warming potentials for a number of gases. CH4 is 73 times as potent as CO2 per kilogram in the atmosphere, 26 times as potent per molecule, or 25 times as potent using the Global Warming Potential metric. However, the concentration by volume of CH4 is 210 times less than that of CO2, and the emissions in kilograms of CH4 are about two orders of magnitude less. Thus, the TSD does not characterize various GHGs as “weak” or “strong,” and we do not find such characterizations useful. Note also that we are unclear the source for the claim that CH4’s potency is 1,000 times greater than CO2’s. We are not aware of such an estimate.

We also find no support for the assertion that water is responsible for 90% or 95% of the greenhouse effect in the scientific literature. Calculations by Kiehl and Trenberth (1997) suggest that water contributes about 60% of the greenhouse effect in clear sky conditions and 75% in cloudy conditions (including the cloud contribution). CO2 contributes about 26% of the greenhouse effect in clear sky 14 conditions, and 15% in cloudy conditions. Because the mass of water in the atmosphere is much larger than the mass of CO2, this implies that per ton or per molecule, CO2 is actually a much more effective GHG than water vapor.

The total effect of increasing CO2 concentrations can be best addressed by actually calculating the radiative forcing resulting from changes in those concentrations. Section 4(a) of the TSD discusses changes in radiative forcing due to increases in CO2 concentrations in the context of other changes in radiative forcing over the last 250 years. This also puts in context how a gas that composes 0.04% of the atmosphere can actually have a large radiative effect.

We disagree with assertions by commenters about a number of the radiative characteristics of CO2. We do agree that the forcing due to increases in CO2 concentrations is roughly logarithmic (Forster et al., 2007). This logarithmic relationship holds over a wide range of concentrations; commenters provided no peerreviewed literature to support the contentions that CO2 has a forcing limit of 325 ppm, a maximum threshold, or no infrared absorption, and we find that these assertions are not consistent with the scientific literature (Forster et al., 2007). Current forcing is almost half (not 75%) of the expected doubling due to the logarithmic relationship cited by one commenter, and because of the inertia of the climate system not all the warming has been realized, so it is not possible to extrapolate future temperature change merely by doubling the past 50 years of change. Comments on future temperature projections are covered in detail in
Volume 4.

Regarding Mars, see the response in Section 3.2.3 of Volume 3 of the Response to Comments document.

For these reasons, we have found no support for the commenters’ conclusions that CO2 does not have a large effect on the Earth’s climate. They provided no literature to support their assertions, and we have determined that our discussion of these issues in Section 4(a) of the TSD is reasonable and scientifically sound.

Carrots to the first to figure out where the 75% of the warming due to CO2 doubling should have already happened comes from

Comments?

Eli can retire Part X - The grim reaper is a hot head

The US EPA responses to challenges to its Endangerment Finding for increasing CO2 concentrations blows hot and cold.

Comment (5-24):
Several commenters (e.g., 3347.3, 11453.1, 3187.3) note that the April 2009 TSD indicated that cold-related deaths presently exceed heat-related deaths in the United States and that this provides evidence that a warming climate will have beneficial effects on temperature-related mortality. Commenters note that on page 70 of the April 2009 TSD, EPA states that 5,983 heat-related deaths were reported in the United States between 1979 and 2002. In the same timeframe, 16,555 people died of extreme cold. A commenter (3187.3) provides a paper by Goklany (2007), which indicates that death from extreme cold exceed death from extreme heat.

Response (5-24):
We have revised the TSD’s estimates of heat-related deaths based on the latest findings of the assessment literature (Karl et al., 2009). Based on these results, other supporting evidence presented in the TSD, and additional evidence cited below, we have determined that the available literature strongly supports the conclusion that extreme heat is, on an average annual base, the leading cause of weather-related death in the United States. We agree that the April 2009 TSD contained statistics that could be interpreted as suggesting that cold-related mortality has recently been higher in the United States than heat-related mortality. The cold-related mortality statistics in the TSD from Ebi et al. (2008) are similar to those cited by Goklany (2007). However, the methods and data for estimating heat-related mortality were recently updated and these revised values are presented in Karl et al. (2009).

The more recent heat-related mortality numbers from Karl et al. (2009) reflect results from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). CDC (2006) reports more than 3,400 deaths from 1999 to 2003 for which exposure to extreme heat was listed as either a contributing factor or the underlying cause of death. This result of roughly 680 heat-related deaths per year is almost identical to the 689 deaths per year from cold exposure reported by Ebi et al. (2008) and summarized in the TSD. CDC (2006) suggests that even the revised heat-related mortality numbers may underestimate total heat-related mortality, noting: “Because heat-related illnesses can exacerbate existing medical conditions and death from heat exposure can be preceded by various symptoms, heat-related deaths can be difficult to identify when illness onset or death is not witnessed by a clinician. In addition, the criteria used to determine heat-related causes of death vary among states. This can lead to underreporting heat-related deaths or to reporting heat as a factor contributing to death rather than the underlying cause.” This issue has long been recognized in attempting to estimate the mortality impact of extreme heat using information from death certificates (American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, 1997). As noted in a subsequent response (5-29), cold-related deaths are likely also underestimated. One complication with these death certificate–based estimates of extreme cold and heat is they are not limited to periods that would be considered heat waves or cold snaps in the location where the death occurs. Therefore, while these results are based in a consistent methodology and data source, they have an uncertain overlap with the occurrence of the weather events of primary interest to the TSD, cold snaps and heat waves. As a result, these data alone do not provide strong evidence the heat-related mortality is presently greater than cold-related mortality.

However, we note that alternative and much higher estimates of heat-related mortality come from analyses of daily urban summertime mortality patterns in Kalkstein and Greene (1997) and Davis et al. (2003a), which use a different methodology to compute heat-related deaths compared to CDC (2006). These studies first define extreme heat events by identifying threshold conditions for an event in a location and then calculate the number of extreme heat–attributable deaths based on differences in daily deaths on extreme heat days compared to longer-term averages. In these studies, heat’s mortality impact is quantified in terms of the excess deaths that result during the extreme heat conditions. By evaluating changes in daily deaths attributable to all causes, this approach also effectively eliminates differences or restriction in using certain causes of death as potential sources of bias in estimating the extreme heat’s mortality impact. This method is also more consistent with the view that heat waves are effectively identified through exceptional weather conditions that result in increases in daily mortality (e.g., Confalonieri et al., 2007; U.S. EPA, 2006a). Although differences in the time series, definitions of urban populations, and other analytical methods prevent an exact comparison of the results in these two studies, both studies (Kalkstein and Greene, 1997; Davis et al., 2003a) estimate that there are approximately 1,700–1,800 excess deaths per year during extreme heat events based on an evaluation of a subset of approximately 40 U.S. metropolitan areas (see U.S. EPA, 2006a). These estimates of extreme heat’s mortality impact are much higher than the corresponding death certificate–based estimates for heat as well as the Ebi et al. (2008) estimate for cold-related mortality summarized in the TSD.

We also note that Davis et al. (2004) find that the net impact of the observed temperature increase from 1964 to 1998 (considering both reduced temperature mortality in winter and increased temperature mortality in summer) was an extra 2.9 deaths (per standard million) per city per year in 28 major U.S. cities. This indicates that extreme heat has been the larger cause of mortality in the recently observed record when temperatures have warmed.
Furthermore, we note that the USGCRP assessment (Karl et al., 2009) specifically refers to a recent study by Borden and Cutter (2008), which concludes heat is the most deadly natural hazard in the United States. It also cites Medina-Ramon and Schwartz (2007), which found that in 50 U.S. cities between 1989 and 2000, extreme heat increased death rates 5.7% while extreme cold increased death rates by only 1.6%. These results are summarized in the TSD.

Though we are aware of a recent study by Andersen and Bell (2009) that finds a similar mortality risk for extremely hot and cold days based on the synthesis of results from 107 U.S. communities (contrasting with Medina-Ramon and Schwartz), Andersen and Bell are clear that cold temperatures more indirectly affect mortality than heat. In addition to the longer lag times for exposure incorporated for the effects of extreme cold (up to 25 days, compared a one-day lag for heat), they note that infectious diseases, which are more common in industrialized countries during colder weather (when people spend more time indoors and in proximity) could account for a substantial portion of the cold-related effect.

Summarizing, both recent studies and the assessment literature provide strong evidence that heat-related mortality presently exceeds cold-related mortality in the United States

Comments?