Joshua Rovner, in his book, F
The actual intelligence picture was irrelevant. Team B simply assumed that Moscow was actively seeking any technology that would allow it to gain a decisive strategic advantageAnd Team B's imagination was quite fertile
The Team B exercise corrupted the estimative process in ways that were wholly predictable. The theoretical benefits of competition were lost because the composition of Team B was lopsided, because the panel spent as much time criticizing the intelligence community as it did evaluating the Soviet threat, and because the outside group relied on open sources. The administration was warned of these problems in advance but did not intervene to insulate the NIE process from political bias. On the contrary, it allowed the exercise to proceed in order to satisfy domestic political imperatives.There is much more at the link detailing the disastrous errors in the Team B report but the worst outcome was Star Wars, as the following Reagan administration used it as justification for the Star Wars build out.
So let the bunnies count the ways that this administration's EPA administrator will build out his Team B
- The membership of Team B Climate will be lopsided
- Team B will spend as much time criticizing the IPCC and National Academy reports as evaluating the threat from climate change
- Team B will rely on open sources, lord help us, like Watts Up With That, Curry's Climate Etc.
History Commons has a long discussion of Team B's fantasies including
Lack of Facts Merely Proof of Soviets' Success - One example that comes up during the debate is B’s assertion that the USSR has a top-secret nonacoustic antisubmarine system. While the CIA analysts struggle to point out that absolutely no evidence of this system exists, B members conclude that not only does the USSR have such a system, it has probably “deployed some operation nonacoustic systems and will deploy more in the next few years.” The absence of evidence merely proves how secretive the Soviets are, they argue.Climateball players have seen this before, and indeed, the run up to the Iraq War featured exactly the same playbook (see History Commons).
Brad Plumer points to Joseph Majkut at the Niskanen Center wondering what could be wrong with such an exercise. Now Brad is a reasonable guy and the Niskanen Center is reasonable as real conservatives can be, but when Eli points out that the pawn is poison Majkut replies
Koonin, of course, is the apparatchik who tried to hijack the APS's drafting of their statement on climate change which required, amongst other things, that wiser heads on the drafting committee step in and Koonin huffing off in full regalia. Eli has written several brilliant posts on the entire farrago but there was one thing that he missed coming from early on in the process, February 2013, which shows what Koonin was up toThough I agree a simple back and forth (as suggested by Koonin) could be just an intellectual comb-over. https://t.co/yORJmGaaTu— Joseph Majkut (@JosephMajkut) June 30, 2017
The type of statement APS should make – simple & declarative or one that incorporates many details – needs consideration. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is also due to report on climate change in 2013; using their review as a trigger for an in-depth look at the APS statement is appropriate.And he tried, oh my how he tried.
Commentary: J. Trebes agreed that using the IPCC review as a trigger is appropriate. Using it as a scientific basis for our statement will mitigate scientific argument within the APS. S. Koonin cautioned that APS should create its own statement and make its own judgment, separate from the IPCC report.